There is considerable controversy over the use of private insurers to deliver public health insurance benefits. We investigate the efficiency consequences of patients enrolling in Medicare Advantage (MA), private managed care organizations that compete with the traditional fee-for-service Medicare program. We use exogenous shocks to MA enrollment arising from plan exits from New York counties in the early 2000s, and utilize unique data that links hospital inpatient utilization to Medicare enrollment
health care utilization of Medicare recipients both inside and outside of Medicare Advantage.
A major advantage of these hospital data is that we obtained permission to longitudinally link it at the individual level to Medicare enrollment …les, so that we can assess how an individual's utilization changes leading up to and following changes to that individual's MA enrollment status.
The second is to use these novel data to identify the causal impact of MA plan enrollment by studying counties in which MA plans completely exited in the early 2000s, and comparing them to counties where there was no exit. In these counties, enrollees who were previously in MA plans had no choice of remaining in MA, so our data allows us to study the utilization impact of moving exogenously from MA plans to the FFS Medicare program.
Doing so, we …nd that there is a substantial rise in inpatient hospital utilization after MA plan exit. We estimate that previous MA enrollees see their utilization of the hospital rise by about 60%, when moving back to the traditional FFS plan. This estimate is comparable to the corresponding estimate of 65% from the RAND Health Insurance Experiment of the 1970s, which randomly assigned patients to managed care plans. The …nding is robust to speci…cation checks and appears to be long-lasting, so that it does not simply re ‡ect pent-up demand that caused a temporary increase in utilization. The increases appear across all types of hospitalizations, but are particularly pronounced for elective visits. We also …nd substantial reductions in the average distance traveled to the hospital when patients exogenously switch from MA to FFS following plan exit. This suggests that the mechanisms for lowering costs under MA plans are both reduced hospital availability and greater restrictions on elective care. At the same time, we …nd no evidence to suggest that the quality of care is rising along any dimension. We …nd no change in the quality of hospitals used by enrollees as measured by typical Medicare metrics, and more signi…cantly we see no reduction in mortality among those who are forced to move from MA to FFS. This suggests that MA plans were delivering care more e¢ ciently than the FFS Medicare program by using fewer hospital resources.
Our …ndings therefore have important implications for Medicare and suggest that increased management of hospital care could lower costs without reducing the quality of care.
Our paper proceeds as follows. Part I provides background on the Medicare Advantage program and reviews the previous literature on MA. Part II describes our data. Part III explores the impact of plan exit on utilization and outcomes. Part IV discusses the implications of the …ndings for Medicare policy. Part V concludes.
Background on Medicare Advantage
Since 1982, Medicare recipients have had the option to enroll in private managed care plans.
Enrollment in the plans has ‡uctuated in response to changes in the generosity of plan reimbursement and has varied substantially across geographic areas at any point in time (McGuire et al 2011) . Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, plan payments for an enrollee were set to be 95 percent of a county's per-capita Medicare FFS expenditures, and were further adjusted based on the recipient's age, gender, disability status, Medicaid enrollment status, and nursing home status (Chaikind et al 2004) . The program's name changed over time, beginning as Medicare managed care and then changing to Medicare+Choice in 1997 and then to Medicare Advantage after 2003. In the pages that follow, we refer to Medicare Part C as Medicare Advantage.
Research demonstrated that individuals enrolling in Medicare managed care plans tended to have signi…cantly lower costs than the average and thus plan contracting actually increased Medicare spending. 2 In response to this, legislation was enacted reducing the future growth rate of private Medicare reimbursement, as part of the 1997 Balanced Budget Act. In this same legislation, the government introduced payment " ‡oors" in counties with low per-capita FFS expenditures given substantially lower private Medicare penetration in those areas. The 2 Studies from the mid 1990s found that utilization among private Medicare enrollees was 12% (Riley et al 1996) to 37% (PPRC 1996) lower than those of demographically comparable enrollees in FFS. While some of this could re ‡ect treatment e¤ects rather than selection, the PPRC study actually compared the two groups, during the time that both were still in FFS (they focused on the 6 months immediately preceding HMO enrollment).
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Bene…ts Improvement and Protection Act of 2000 further increased payment ‡oors in urban counties that had low per-capita FFS expenditures, as described below (Chaikind et al 2004) .
Despite these changes, private Medicare enrollment of 5.3 million in 2003 was approximately equal to its 1997 level (5.4 million) (KFF 2014) ; the increases in enrollment in ‡oor counties were approximately o¤set by lower enrollment in other counties. These di¤erential trends in enrollment were driven by the more modest reimbursement growth across non- ‡oor counties. 3 A large body of previous research has investigated the e¤ect of Medicare Advantage on health care expenditures, the utilization of medical care, and health outcomes (see McGuire et al, 2011 for an excellent review). One challenge when estimating these e¤ects is the endogeneity of MA enrollment -individuals have the option to enroll in or disenroll from an MA plan. To account for this, previous studies have taken a variety of approaches. One subset of research has estimated cross-sectional models that include a rich set of controls for individual's age, health status, and related factors, assuming that there are no remaining unobserved di¤erences between those who choose to enroll in managed care and those who do not (Landon et al, 2012) . Another branch of studies has used instrumental variable approaches, with their methods assuming that certain factors (e.g. MA penetration in the local market) in ‡uence plan choice but do not a¤ect utilization (Mello et al, 2002) . A …nal strand of the literature has used longitudinal data to follow individuals over time and compare the evolution of Medicare spending or other outcomes of interest among those switching between MA and traditional Medicare and those not switching; Brown et al (2014) examine 3 Partly because of the stagnant MA enrollment growth, in 2003 the Medicare Modernization Act raised reimbursement in all areas. The government also moved to a system of risk adjustment that began in the early-2000s and that paid plans more for individuals with diabetes, pneumonia, or other medical conditions. In 2006 the government moved to a bidding system whereby plans could submit a bid for expected costs of providing coverage to recipients, which is comparable to traditional Medicare in scope. If a plan's bid fell below county-level benchmarks, the plan would rebate 3 4 of the di¤erence to enrollees in the form of enhanced bene…ts or reduced premiums, while the government would keep the remainder. If a bid was above the benchmark, the recipient would pay the full di¤erence between the bid and benchmark, in the form of higher premiums (Chaikind et al, 2004) . The A¤ordable Care Act has further transformed plan reimbursement by gradually reducing benchmarks from 2011 to 2017, with the largest reductions occurring in counties with the highest levels of per-capita FFS spending (Biles et al, 2012) . This increase in reimbursement has led to a steady rise in Medicare Advantage enrollment since 2004, and it now stands at more than three times as many people (17 million) and more than twice as large a share of enrollment (31%) as 2004. Data available at http://k¤.org/medicare/fact-sheet/medicare-advantage/ cases of voluntary switching, while Parente et al (2005) examine cases of switching following plan exit. Critically, plan exit in the latter study is incomplete, meaning that individuals can still remain in MA by switching to a plan that remains active; as such, in both cases, the switching decision between MA and traditional Medicare remains endogenous.
Altogether, the …ndings from this research are mixed, with most …nding that Medicare Advantage does reduce utilization; however, it is di¢ cult to disentangle these estimated e¤ects from favorable selection into MA plans (Mello et al, 2003) .
A related area of research has investigated the e¤ect of plan reimbursement on MA enrollment and on the average characteristics of MA enrollees. These studies have exploited variation over time (Cawley et al, 2005; Afendulis et al, 2013) and across geographic areas (Cabral et al, 2014; Duggan et al, 2014) in the generosity of plan reimbursement and …nd that there is a strong positive e¤ect on MA enrollment.
A third area of research has considered the e¤ect of Medicare Advantage (or managed care among the privately insured) on utilization for those enrolled in traditional Medicare.
The likely mechanism for such an e¤ect is that health care providers may change the way that they treat individuals enrolled in traditional Medicare as more of their patients become enrolled in managed care (Glied and Gra¤ Zivin, 2002) . The results from this research suggest that reimbursement-induced increases in Medicare Advantage enrollment reduce utilization among those in traditional Medicare and that this e¤ect partially o¤sets the greater spending on Medicare Advantage enrollees (Baicker et al, 2013; Afendulis et al. 2013 ).
There is a broader literature which has evaluated the impact of managed care on health care utilization. This literature follows the same type of approaches discussed above, such as controlling for observable di¤erences across patients in FFS and managed care (Cutler et al 2000) and instrumenting for managed care enrollment using area factors such as the area penetration of managed care plans (Baker, 2000) . These studies typically …nd that managed care plans lower utilization, but are subject to the caveats noted above.
There is, however, one source of exogenous experimental variation, which is an arm of the 6 famous RAND Health Insurance Experiment of the 1970s. Best known for the randomization of individuals across health insurance plans of di¤erential generosity, the RAND HIE also randomized one set of individuals into the Group Health Cooperative of Puget Sound (an HMO) and another set into a fee-for-service plan (Manning et al., 1987) . This study found very large reductions in inpatient care in the managed care plan, with roughly 65% higher inpatient utilization under FFS relative to managed care. At the same time, outpatient utilization was comparable across the two settings (Manning et al, 1985; Manning et al, 1987) .
Data and Empirical Strategy
We use administrative datasets from CMS and New York State, which contain information on Medicare & Medicare Advantage enrollment status, individual-level utilization metrics for those in MA as well as FFS, and individual-level mortality indicators. Our ability to track individual-level hospital inpatient utilization in Medicare Advantage is unique, as is our ability to continuously track individual-level utilization for those switching between MA & FFS. The dearth of available Medicare Advantage claims data has hindered past research, and is an issue that we overcome here. In this section, we discuss the various data sources used for this analysis and sample selection restrictions imposed. Further details are provided in the Data Appendix.
Medicare & MA Enrollment Data
We obtain administrative Medicare data from CMS, in the form of a denominator …le con- period, and is national in scope. This data also contains information on the demographic characteristics of each enrollee, including birth date and age, gender, race, state of residence, 7 and county of residence.
As the Medicare Denominator data only identi…es overall MA enrollment status, and not the speci…c plan to which an individual may belong, we supplement the data with public-use …les from CMS, containing national Medicare Advantage enrollment information at a plancounty-year level. Using this public-use …le, we are able to identify the extent to which any US county experienced plan-exit, along with the timing of that exit. Speci…cally, we are able to identify those counties experiencing complete plan-exit, and the years in which this took place. of whether they happen to be enrolled in Medicare FFS or Medicare Advantage at any given point, since hospitals compile uniform data across all payers. Given our approach for constructing this panel, individuals are included in the sample even if they've had no hospital utilization throughout the study period. With this data, we can bypass issues of sample selection that would plague any analysis that uses just stand-alone hospital discharge data.
New York Utilization Data
We aggregate our measures of hospital utilization to the person-year level. We focus on cumulative, yearly metrics of the following: number of visits, number of days stayed, number of procedures performed, and the log of hospital charge amounts. 5 The means of these utilization measures, for our two cohorts of interest, are presented in Table 1 .
Among those initially in Fee-for-Service Medicare, these measures appear to be at least 60% higher than among those initially in Medicare Advantage; however, the extent to which this disparity is driven by patient composition, rather than by treatment di¤erentials, is not readily discernible.
Unfortunately, we are unable to include outpatient data, as it is not collected in the same way in New York State. This limits our ability to speak to the impact of Medicare Advantage on total medical spending. That said, studies of non-Medicare HMO's have found no meaningful HMO e¤ect on outpatient utilization, relative to a fee-for-service alternative (Manning et al 1987; Manning et al 1985) .
Mortality Data
We use …elds in CMS's Medicare Denominator data, to construct person-year mortality indicators. These data are national in scope, and cover the entirety of our sample period.
In constructing our sample, we allow for sample attrition through mortality; as such, if an individual dies in 2002, their mortality indicator will be positive for that year, and the individual will not appear in the sample in the following year.
Sample Restrictions
We focus on the 1998-2003 period, given that subsequent increases to MA reimbursement resulted in a re-entry of plans to many counties that had previously experienced exit, with virtually no counties having complete exit of MA plans after this period. We restrict to Medicare recipients over 65, and restrict to those who were originally eligible for Medicare by virtue of age, rather than disability. We also restrict to those already in Medicare in 1998; as such, we exclude those who aged into Medicare later in the study period. This allows us to construct a baseline measure of utilization for every individual in our sample at least two years before any of the MA exits that we study occurred. We construct cohorts based on individuals'Medicare Advantage/FFS enrollment status at the start of the study period, to combat bias from voluntary switching between the two at a later point.
Throughout our plan-exit analyses, our treatment group is made up of eight counties that saw complete plan exit, over either a one or two year period. Altogether, these counties accounted for about 3% of all Medicare Advantage enrollees in New York State, prior to plan-exit, and likewise accounted for about 7.5% of all FFS recipients. These eight exit counties have MA penetration rates of 6.7% on average, as opposed to an overall NY average of 15.2%. In six of the counties, exit is over a one year period; in the other two counties, it is over a two-year period. The exiting plans are a mix of national for-pro…t carriers (the largest enrollment was in Aetna) and local non-pro…t carriers (the second largest was in the Capital Area Community plan); altogether there were six plans exiting. Some carriers exited all New York counties in which they operated, while other carriers selectively exited certain counties and continued being active in others.
While we cannot fully explain plan exit, one cause of exit was clearly low reimbursement rates. A sizeable literature …nds that the MA share of Medicare enrollment is strongly related to MA reimbursement rates (Afendulis et al 2013 , Cawley et al 2005 , Pope et al 2006 . In the Appendix, we demonstrate that reimbursement changes over this period are strongly associated with the type of plan exits that we study. In particular, we …nd that each $100 per month rise in MA reimbursement leads to around a 5% decrease in the number of enrollees in exiting MA plans, as a fraction of Medicare recipients in that county. We are unable to use reimbursement changes as instruments for plan exit, however, as they have direct e¤ects on the treatment of MA patients even in counties that do not see exit, and perhaps even spillover e¤ects on the treatment of FFS patients. But we demonstrate below 10 that plan exit appears to be an exogenous shock to the counties that we study.
Empirical Strategy
As reviewed above, enrollment in an MA plan results from endogenous decisions by seniors that may be correlated with their health status. Thus any comparison of those who do and do not choose to join MA plans may be biased. Our approach instead is to look at a sample of individuals who exogenously lose access to MA plans: seniors residing in counties where all available MA plans have exited. Such seniors have no option of choosing an MA plan. For seniors who were previously enrolled in an MA plan, this results in an exogenous shift out of MA into FFS care. As part of our main approach, we do not consider "partial" plan exits, where some plans leave a county but others remain, due to the endogeneity of the decision to remain in an MA plan. The two counties with partial plan exit during our study period (Nassau and Su¤olk) are excluded from the analysis. We use the data described above to estimate regressions of the following form:
(1)
Where i indexes individuals, j counties and t years; UTIL is one of our measures of utilization and/or quality; EXIT is a dummy for whether the MA plans have exited county j in year t; X is a limited set of demographic controls (5 year age group dummies and gender); and j and t are a full set of county and year …xed e¤ects. For the two counties that exit over two years, the "EXIT" variable takes on a value of 0.5 in the …rst year and 1.0 in the second year. All standard errors are clustered at the county level.
Results
As discussed in Part II, here we examine the impact of plan exits on the utilization of There is a steady upward trend for both sets of counties, but an enormous jump up for counties in which MA plans exit around the time of that exit. The trend is more rapid during the …rst year as the two year-exit counties are fully integrated, and then trends return to parallel. This previews our …nding of a robust increase in inpatient utilization among those initially enrolled in MA in exit counties.
The regression analysis of the impact of plan exit is shown in Table 2 , for the sample of individuals who are initially in an MA plan. We estimate the change in utilization in counties that see plan exit versus those that do not while controlling for a full set of county and year indicators. The coe¢ cient of interest is multiplied by an indicator for being in an exit county interacted with the period after exit, controlling for a full set of county dummies and year indicators. Further, the standard errors for all our regression results are clustered at a county-level, to control for possible within-county serial correlation, since that's the level at which plan exit varies. Altogether, the results con…rm the implications of Figure 1 :
there are very sizeable increases in utilization along every dimension.
In particular, we show that those MA enrollees who see plan exit in their county (and who therefore move to FFS Medicare) see their number of hospital admissions rise by an average of 0.105; relative to the ex-ante mean of 0.177, this represents an increase of approximately 60 percent. Total hospital days rise by 0.65 (48%), and the number of hospital procedures 12 rise by 0.13 (33%). Total charges rise by 53%. 6
The results therefore suggest that exit of MA plans led to very sizeable increases in hospital utilization by former MA enrollees, with an estimated magnitude that is comparable to …ndings from the RAND Health Insurance Experiment (Manning et al 1987; Manning et al 1985) . The rise in utilization appears to be mostly along the margin of admissions, with proportionally smaller increases in days and in the number of procedures. Given that sicker or more severely injured patients will tend to remain in the hospital for longer, this suggests that the marginal admission is for a less serious condition.
Speci…cation Checks
We further explore these …ndings in Table 3 , where we consider robustness tests along two dimensions. First, we present a speci…cation that includes both lags and leads of the exit e¤ect. The lead coe¢ cient allows us to test for di¤erential trends across treatment and control counties. The lags allow us to address the important question of whether these large e¤ects simply represent pent-up demand by those who were treated less intensively under MA plans, which would then fade over time as enrollees become acclimated to the FFS environment.
The results of this speci…cation are shown in the …rst panel of Table 3 . We …nd no signi…cant lead e¤ect, consistent with no di¤erential pre-trends across these di¤erent types of counties. 7 In addition, we …nd that the estimated utilization response occurs quickly and gets slightly stronger over the …rst three years. This is inconsistent with a pent-up demand explanation, at least over this three year window.
Another concern is that, given the relatively small number of exit counties (eight), there may be some other correlated factor that is changing at the same time as plan exit. To address this concern, we reestimate our models on the sample of FFS Medicare enrollees in these same NY counties over this same period. These enrollees should be impacted by other factors that impact medical demand or supply over this period, but should be largely una¤ected by the MA exits. Of course, to the extent that there are important spillovers from MA onto treatment of FFS, then the reduced presence of MA in these counties could lead to increased treatment of FFS bene…ciaries. But such an e¤ect would be biased in the same direction as our …ndings, with those enrolled in FFS initially also using more care when MA plans exit.
The second panel of Table 3 shows the results of this exercise. In fact, we …nd no signi…cant or sizeable impacts on those enrolled in FFS in our baseline year of 1998 in the counties with plan exit. This suggests that there are not broad trends towards less e¢ cient care in this set of counties (as well as no signi…cant spillovers) and that we are therefore accurately capturing the e¤ect of MA enrollment.
Mechanisms
The striking increase in medical utilization from MA plan exit raises the question of how Another mechanism is through restricting choice of hospital, thereby eliminating the marginal hospitalization (which would be consistent with the severity results above). To assess this point, we measure the impact of MA plan exit on distance traveled and travel time to the hospital using the latitutude and longitude of the Medicare recipient's zip code of residence and the zip code of the hospital. As discussed in the Appendix, these distance/time calculations re ‡ect driving rather than "as the crow ‡ies" distances. Another source of reduced hospitalization under MA plans could be fewer hospitalizations among the least sick enrollees. To assess this we next explore the change in the types of hospitalizations that take place when MA plans exit. We look at a variety of di¤erent types of hospitalizations, and in each case we can compare the relative e¤ects to the roughly 60% overall rise in hospital visits. The results described below are, again, robust to the inclusion of DRG …xed e¤ects, suggesting that they are not driven by changes to visit composition.
We begin by looking at two di¤erent types of admissions. The …rst is "emergency"
hospitalizations, which are inpatient admissions that initiate in the emergency room. We …nd that the proportional e¤ects for emergency care (at 27%) are about half the magnitude of the full sample results (at around 60% jump). In the rows that follow, we divide hospitalizations into those that are elective and non-elective, as speci…ed in the discharge data, which de…nes elective admissions as those where "the patient's condition permits adequate time to schedule the admission based on the availability of a suitable accommodation". We …nd that there is a much larger proportional rise in elective hospitalizations, which increase by 131% of their baseline value after MA plans exit. This is in contrast to non-elective hospitalizations, which rise by less than half (46%) of their baseline value.
Indeed, as the next set of rows show, there is a much larger proportional rise in the inten- 8 One concern with this set of estimates is that MA a¤ects the composition of hospitalizations. To the extent that the marginal admissions are to hospitals that are close to the patient's home, this would tend to mechanically lower the average distance when patients return to FFS. But given the magnitude of the decline in average distance, this change in composition would not be su¢ cient to explain the di¤erence even if the average distance for marginal admissions was zero. 9 Recent work on HMO's in the Medicaid setting provides further indication that distance to nearest hospital could be a driver of the e¤ect estimated here; in New York's Medicaid program, the FFS option is not associated with reduced distance to the nearest hospital, and produces only 30% higher inpatient utilization (Vabson 2015), compared to the 60% increase that we estimate for Medicare. As such, the greater e¤ect of HMO's under Medicare could be accounted for by a greater e¤ect on distance to hospital (and other aspects of hospital networks). sity with which elective hospitalizations are treated. The number of procedures performed rises by 94% for elective admissions, and only by 18% for non-elective ones.
These results therefore suggest two important mechanisms through which MA plans reduce hospital utilization. The …rst is to restrict patients to hospitals that involve considerably longer travel. The second is to more tightly restrict elective and non-urgent hospitalizations.
In Table 5 , we examine these mechanisms in further depth, by comparing the e¤ect of plan exit based on individuals'ex-ante distances to in-network MA hospitals. MA enrollees living close to in-network MA hospitals would experience a smaller decrease in hospital distance, following plan exit, compared to MA recipients living farther away. We break out our baseline sample of those initially in MA into two cohorts, based on each individual's distance to their nearest in-network MA hospital (pre-plan exit): the closest 50% and the farthest 50%. We measure whether a given hospital is in-network based on whether enrollees of MA plans in the corresponding county visit it at greater than de minimus rates. 10 We …nd that in these exit counties, 45% of hospitals on average (and 47% of hospital beds) are classi…ed as in-network.
As the …rst column of Table 5 shows, both of these cohorts experienced a reduction in distance traveled to the hospital following plan exit, although obviously the reduction is larger in the group that lives farther from an in-network hospital. We also …nd that the cohort that was closer to an in-network hospital experienced a relatively larger increase in utilization, following plan-exit. The higher level of visits is driven almost entirely by a higher level of admissions from the emergency room. This suggests that restrictions on emergency admissions could have a disproportionate impact on those who would most likely use the ER, in this case those living closest to the hospital. The results further suggest that a higher threshold on admissions from the ER could be a more likely mechanism for 10 For these purposes, we de…ne de minimus as receiving fewer than 4% of MA hospital admissions, for a given county. In markets with exiting plans, there typically are only a limited number of hospitals, each of which would enjoy substantially higher market share, in the absence of network restrictions (we con…rm this by looking at visits under FFS). We do not set these thresholds to zero, given that individuals will go to out-of-network hospitals even in the presence of network restrictions. utilization reductions under MA, than increased distances to hospital.
Quality Impacts
If the exit of MA plans is causing such a substantial increase in utilization, a natural question is whether this is delivering bene…ts to enrollees through higher quality care or improved health outcomes. We explore this issue in Table 6 by examining a broad variety of quality indicators.
To measure the quality of care at the hospital level, we turn to two sets of standardized measures from the CMS Hospital Quality Initiative database. The …rst set of metrics consists of process measures, which are featured prominently as part of CMS's Hospital Compare tool; these capture the fraction of the time that a hospital follows 'best-practices', in the treatment of a listed condition. Possible best practices include the administration of beta blockers or antibiotics, for such conditions as heart failure, heart attacks, and pneumonia. Altogether, for this set of measures, higher ratings would imply better quality of care.
Meanwhile, the CMS Compare outcome measures are risk-adjusted mortality and readmission metrics for each hospital; these re ‡ect the percentage of individuals dying/being readmitted in the 30-day period following discharge, for the following separate conditions: heart attacks, heart failure, and pneumonia. As such, these metrics are conditional on initial hospitalization. Altogether, for these measures, higher ratings would imply worse quality of care.
Using these measures, we do not see any consistent evidence of moving to higher quality hospitals, as seven of the nine measures are insigni…cant; further, one of the signi…cant coe¢ cients suggest higher quality (improved process for pneumonia) while the other suggests lower quality (worse outcomes for heart failure). Moreover, all of the coe¢ cients are very small relative to mean values and precisely estimated, ruling out meaningful impacts.
We next turn to more direct process measures of outcomes created from our discharge data. One such measure, the 60-day hospital readmission rate, can proxy for quality given that many readmissions result from either ine¤ective in-hospital or ine¤ective post-hospital care (Neal Axon et al, 2011) . Another measure, preventable hospitalizations, identi…ed those hospitalizations that are avertable under adequate outpatient care, such as visits involving chronic conditions. We identify these preventable hospitalizations using AHRQ's PQI algorithm, which works o¤ the DRG codes and procedures associated with a given admission (DHHS, 2001) . For our analyses, we aggregate the readmission and preventable hospitalization measures at a person-year level. Both of these measures are conditional on hospitalization, so that we can assess whether under FFS the marginal hospitalization is more likely to be a readmission or be preventable. As shown in Table 1 , the number of readmissions is higher among those initially in FFS than in the initially MA cohort, consistent with the selection evidence discussed above, although the number of preventable hospitalizations is lower.
When MA plans exit, we …nd that both measures rise -that is, plan exit does not appear to be translating to more e¢ cient care on net that is lowering readmissions or preventable admissions. The odds of readmission, conditional on an initial hospitalization, rises by about 15% among those initially in MA plans after plans exit. Meanwhile, the odds of a given hospitalization being preventable rises by 10%. By these measures, therefore, quality is falling for those initially enrolled in MA following the exit of MA plans.
Finally, we examine the impact on mortality. For measuring mortality, we can extend our analysis to consider not only the impacts in New York, but across the nation as a whole. 11
This allows us to substantially increase the precision of our estimates on exit e¤ects.
The e¤ects on mortality are shown at the bottom of Table 6 . Both estimates are in fact positive, suggesting that plan exit leads to higher mortality, although neither estimate is signi…cant. Most importantly, we can rule out a meaningful reduction in mortality associated with the higher hospital utilization under FFS plans. Even with the less precise New York only data, we can rule out a reduction in mortality rates in excess of .35% (with 95% con…dence) from a baseline of 4.1%; with the more precise national data, meanwhile, we can rule out a reduction in excess of .10% (and also rule out an increase in excess of .14%), o¤ a baseline of 4.4%. Given that utilization of the hospital goes up by more than 60%, this is a fairly tight bound.
The results from this section appear to indicate that there is a sizeable ine¢ ciency in transitioning elders out of Medicare Advantage into the FFS program. Utilization of, and spending in, the hospital rises substantially, with no consistent indication of quality improvement (although travel to the hospital is greatly reduced). If anything, we …nd a reduction in quality, with readmissions, preventable hospitalizations and mortality (the last insigni…cantly) increasing after the shift out of managed care plans.
Conclusions
The role of private players in public insurance is the subject of a central debate in U.S. public policy. This debate is perhaps most heated around the role of Medicare Advantage plans. Advocates claim that the higher e¢ ciency of such private options should push the government towards expanding the role of managed care plans. Opponents point to the sizeable positive selection faced by these plans (and their high baseline reimbursement, even independent of selection) to claim that they are over-reimbursed and are costing, rather than saving, government dollars.
Central to this debate is the question of whether MA plans actually deliver care more e¢ ciently. Our paper contributes to the literature on this point in two important ways.
First, we make use of data that tracks the treatment of both traditional Medicare (FFS) recipients and MA enrollees. Second, we make use of exogenous variation in MA availability, arising from county-level exit of MA plans. Using these empirical advantages, we document sizeable increases in hospital inpatient utilization along many dimensions when MA plans 20 exit a county. Hospital inpatient utilization rises by 60%, and total charges by more than 50%. We …nd that MA insurers may achieve this by reducing the use of the hospital for elective and emergency cases, and also by increasing the distance that a patient needs to travel to the nearest hospital. Moreover, we …nd no evidence that this is accompanied by reduced quality of care for Medicare patients when enrolled in MA; quality indicators, if anything, deteriorate when MA plans exit.
There are a number of caveats to these results. One concern is that the e¤ects of plan exit-which we measure-may not be congruent to the e¤ect from plan entry. That said, we do address one major di¤erence between exit and entry, which is that exit could be accompanied by short-run pent up demand, which would dissipate over time. Examining utilization for the three years following plan exit, we …nd no evidence for pent-up demand, as the e¤ects do not appear to fade over that timeframe. An additional caveat is that plan exits may be correlated with other factors that impact patient care, but the lack of pre-treatment e¤ects, and the lack of e¤ects for FFS patients, suggest no such e¤ects.
There remain two other limitations to our analysis, however. First, we are only able to track inpatient care. It is possible that the main mechanism through which MA plans reduced hospital care was by increasing spending on primary and outpatient care. However, the evidence that we provide is not consistent with that interpretation: preventable hospitalizations as a share of hospitalizations do not appear to change when MA plans exit.
Furthermore, the closest existing study of HMO's provide no evidence of o¤setting increases to outpatient care, despite …nding large decreases in the inpatient setting (Manning et al 1987) . That said, we may still be overstating the e¢ ciency gains associated with MA plans, by ignoring non-hospital care.
Second, our measure of outcomes is an extreme one, mortality. There may be other dimensions along which outcomes improve when MA plans exit that are not captured by our measures. We have documented one such outcome, distance traveled to the hospital. There may be others, such as treatment quality or palliative care, which are not well captured by 21 our coarse mortality measure.
With those caveats in mind, it is worth discussing the implications of our …ndings for government policy towards MA plans. Our results have subtle implications for MA reimbursement policy within the existing system. On the one hand, higher reimbursement leads to more MA plan entry and greater choice for consumers (Afendulis 2013 , Cabral et al 2014 . On the other hand, higher reimbursement increases inframarginal payments to plans that are already in the market. Existing evidence suggests that the MA plans themselves keep more than half of this reimbursement change (Cabral et al. 2014 , while much of what remains is a transfer to Medicare recipients. Optimal reimbursement must therefore weigh the social e¢ ciencies of care for those newly enrolling in MA against the deadweight loss of raising the revenue to pay these higher rates for those already enrolled in the plan. When MA plans are scarce, it seems likely that there are e¢ ciency gains given the …ndings we have here. But as the MA share grows, these e¢ ciency gains may become small relative to the inframarginal transfers. 12
On the other hand, our results suggest that there are large e¢ ciencies from ensuring that at least some managed care option is available to enrollees. This could occur through a premium support system of the type discussed in CBO (2013), which would set up competitive exchanges through which private plans could compete with the government option.
Alternatively, the government could establish a monopoly MA provider for each area, and auction o¤ the number of MA slots for the area, in that way minimizing the reimbursement of MA plans while ensuring MA plan availability. Future work could usefully explore the tradeo¤s of these alternatives. sion, 1996 . "Total Medicare Advantage Enrollment: 1992 ." Kaiser Family Foundation, 2014 . Available at http://k¤.org/medicare/slide/total-medicare-advantage-enrollment-1992-2014/ Vabson, Boris. "The Magnitude and Incidence of E¢ ciency Gains from Contracting: Evidence from Medicaid." University of Pennsylvania, mimeo, 2015. as part of the analysis, while standard errors are clustered at the county level. The unit of observation is at the person-year level, for the 1998-2003 period. The sample is restricted to those over 65, who are also actively enrolled in Medicare. In addition, the sample is restricted to those enrolled in Medicare Advantage (or FFS-as speci…ed), as of the start of the study period (1998). This data was constructed using discharge-level hospital data from New York State and person-month level Medicare enrollment records from CMS; these two datasets were linked using SSN and other …elds, and subsequently aggregated to a person-year level. Sample inclusion is not conditional on utilization. Incidentally, MA county-level benchmarks are largely a function of each county's per capita FFS costs. Given this, it is necessary to construct an instrument for MA reimbursement, which would be uncorrelated with other factors that could also be a¤ecting plan exit.
To do so, we make use of policy-driven variation in county-level MA benchmarks, resulting from the Bene…ts Improvement and Protection Act of 2000.
One change legislated by the act, which we make use of, is an increase in the MA benchmark ‡oor, from $401 to $475; benchmarks were set to the ‡oor level across counties with per capita FFS costs under that ‡oor. We make use of an additional change from the act:
the introduction of a di¤erentiated ‡oor, which was set at $525 and which applied to urban counties only; for this purpose, counties were classi…ed as urban if they were part of metropolitan areas with populations exceeding 250,000. Our instrument is at a county-year level, and is de…ned as the di¤erence between the actual benchmarks and the counterfactual benchmark that would have prevailed in the absence of these two changes; as such, the instrument e¤ectively corresponds to the bump in benchmarks that certain counties received, from this legislation. Given this, the instrument is mechanically set to $0 for all years preceding 2001. It is also set to $0 for all counties for which the ‡oor was not binding at any 
Sample Restrictions; Treatment and Control Group Construction:
The sample is restricted to New York State; it is further restricted to those qualifying for Medicare on the basis of age, and excludes those qualifying by virtue of disability. For most of our analyses (and in the construction of treatment/control groups), we focus on those enrolled in Medicare, as of January 1998. As such, those who aged into Medicare at a later point in our study period would not be included as part of our study sample. In addition, for each Medicare recipient, the sample is restricted to those years during which they were in Medicare in NY State for at least one month; hence, some individuals may drop out of the sample as a result of death or change of residence.
Our primary treatment and control groups are further restricted to those in PRIVATE Medicare A.5 as of January 1998; for these purposes, we de…ne private Medicare enrollment status based on information in the CMS Medicare denominator data; this allows our analyses to be robust to possible miscoding of private Medicare status in the discharge …les (such miscoding appears to be common).
We de…ne county of residence (and by implication, whether an individual is in an 'exit county'
and is assigned to the treatment or control group) based on their original county of residence as of January 1998. We exclude partial-exit counties from all of our results, which we de…ne as counties that by 2003 lost between 25 and 90% of their original 1998 MA enrollment. In New York State, there are two such counties altogether (Nassau and Su¤olk), whereas nationwide there are 430 such counties (out of over 3,000 in total).
Outcome Measures, From Individual Inpatient Panel:
Total Procs: This measure re ‡ects the number of procedures performed across all inpatient visits for a given person, over the course of a year; given that New York's discharge data can only track up to 15 procedures associated with a given inpatient visit, this measure should be considered a ‡oor (although only a tiny fraction of all inpatient hospitalizations involve 15+ procedures).
Total Charges: De…ned as raw inpatient charges; note that this does not re ‡ect the amount actually paid to hospitals (or the negotiated rate), but is instead an accounting based measure that is uniform across payers. Note that when looking at the non-logged form of this measure, we winsorize the data at the 98th percentile, meaning that all person-year charge amounts in excess of that percentile would get set to the 98th percentile.
Log Total Charges: De…ned as the log of (charges+1); as such, even observations with zero raw charges will still get included as part of the analysis.
Distance to Hospital, Miles/Minutes: This is calculated as the driving distance between the center of a patient's zip code of residence, and the center of the zip code in which a given hospital is located. These driving distances, in terms of minutes as well as miles, are calculated using Microsoft's MapPoint program; they re ‡ect driving, rather than crow ‡ies distances.
A.6
Elective: Hospital visits that are de…ned in the type of admission …eld in New York State's data as follows: 'The patient's condition permits adequate time to schedule the admission based on the availability of a suitable accommodation.'
Emergency: Hospital visits that are de…ned in the type of admission …eld in New York State's data as follows: 'The patient requires immediate medical intervention as a result of severe, life threatening, or potentially disabling conditions.'
Outcome Measures, From CMS Compare Data:
CMS Outcome Ratings: Outcome measures are at a hospital-level and are taken from CMS's 2014 Hospital Compare Data. They focus on visits involving heart attacks (MI), heart failure (HF), and pneumonia (PN). The rates shown re ‡ect odds of death or readmission within 30-days, in percentage terms; these rates are conditional on initial hospitalization for the listed condition.
For example, a heart attack mortality rate of 15% implies that if an individual is hospitalized for a heart attack, they have a 15% likelihood of death within 30 days of that hospitalization (at that particular hospital). In addition, these rates are risk-adjusted for hospital case-mix. Altogether, these rates are inversely related to quality, as higher rates correspond to greater numbers of mortality and readmissions.
CMS Process Ratings: Process measures are at a hospital-level and are taken from CMS's 2014 Hospital Compare Data. They gauge the degree of adherence to medical guidelines for treatment of heart attacks, heart failure, and pneumonia. Among the subset of hospitalizations for which each process is applicable (i.e.-heart attacks), these rates re ‡ect the share of hospitalizations among which process was followed. For example, a rate of .85 for heart attacks implies that for a particular hospital, process was adhered to 85% of the time. Such medical guidelines include, for example, the timely and appropriate administering of Aspirin, antibiotics, beta-blockers, and vaccines. Altogether, these rates are directly proportional to quality, as higher rates correspond to greater process adherence. A.8
